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bility of the exemption if the Rules are not complied with may be
anticipated.
Although Rule 144 has been in effect for three years," 5 the volume
of requests for replies by the SEC still appears to be immense." These
requests primarily concern the computation of holding periods, and
the definition of "restricted" securities. In analyzing questions concerning the holding periods, the SEC has emphasized that the purchaser should be subjected to the risks of his investment, thereby
preventing any indirect public distribution. The numerous amendments adopted in 1974 ease some of the burden on the issuer without
compromising the purposes of the Rule, and therefore, facilitate compliance with its provisions.
III. RULE 10b-5
A.

Birnbaum Triumphant-The Supreme Court Upholds the
Purchaser-SellerRequirement

Rule 10b-5's purchaser-seller requirement,' judicially labelled the
Birnbaum Rule, 2 is now the most formidable obstacle confronting
securities fraud claimants. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores3 resolved any judicial doubts

7' For a general discussion of the development of Rule 144 over the 1972-1974
period, see Lipton, Fogelson & Warnken, Rule 144-A Summary Review After Two
Years, 29 Bus. LAW. 1183 (1974). For checklists to determine the applicability of Rule
144, see Green, Selling Restricted Securities Under Rule 144-A Practical Guide, 18
PRAc. LAW. No. 5 at 13 (1972); Starr, Suggested Rule 144 Checklist, 27 Bus. LAW. 1073
(1972); Note, A ChecklistFor Compliance With Rule 144,67 Nw. U.L. REv. 169 (Supp.
1972).
71 Nineteen requests are reported in the CCH reporter, however, there were over
500 replies by the SEC to inquiries regarding Rule 144. See 1974 No-Action and Interpretive Letters lists, 5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. at 63,111-275 (1974).
'Both § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and Rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), prohibit fraudulent activities "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."
2
The purchaser-seller requirement was first formulated in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
343 U.S.L.W. 4707 (June 9, 1975). The complaint in Blue Chip alleged misrepresentation in the offering of securities made pursuant to an antitrust consent decree
which required the defendant, Blue Chip Stamps, to offer stock to all stamp users. The
defendant misrepresented the true value of the securities, which allegedly exceeded the
offering price by $214, thereby inducing the plaintiff not to make the purchase. The
district court denied the plaintiff standing because there had been no actual purchase
or sale of securities between the parties. Under such circumstances, the lower court
determined that there was no causal connection between the misrepresentation and
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on this question of standing: plaintiffs who do not meet the statutory
definition of purchaser or seller under the Securities Exchange Act
will be barred from seeking remedies under Rule 10b-5. The decision,
aside from unequivocally upholding the puichaser-seller requirement,4 additionally suggests that future Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs will find
the courts less receptive to expansive application of the Rule. Although the Court adopted what had been the majority rule among
circuit courts as to plaintiff standing,5 Blue Chip is the first case in
the Supreme Court to restrict the explosive growth of Rule 10b-5 in
recent years. One implication is that Blue Chip's limiting principles
may be carried over into other areas where elements of a claim under
Rule 10b-5 also have been expansively construed by the lower federal
courts.'
A more immediate consequence of the decision, however, is
whether the purchaser-seller requirement will be inflexibly applied to
potential plaintiffs in the future, or whether any of the modifications
of the Bimbaum Rule survived Blue Chip. The rule had not been
inflexibly applied by the lower federal courts to exclude claimants
who were not strictly purchasers or sellers of securities.7 Bimbaum
had been viewed by some courts as a policy both limiting the number
of potential plaintiffs and restricting antifraud litigation, rather than
as a rigid rule of standing. Thus, four exceptions from a strict applithe injury, and that any damage award would be speculative. 339 F. Supp. at 40.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, however, reasoning
that neither ground cited for denial of standing was present in the case. Other courts
previously had granted standing in similar contexts under the aborted purchase or sale
exception to the Birnbaum Rule, based upon the premise that the existence of a
contractual relationship between the parties constituted sufficient evidence of causation and damages. The circuit court concluded that the consent decree ordering the
offer of securities by Blue Chip Stamps served the same function as a contractual
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Thus the plaintiff had proper
standing to sue under the modified purchaser-seller requirement. Manor Drug Stores
v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), reversed, - U.S.
_ 43

U.S.L.W. 4707 (June 9, 1975).
'43 U.S.L.W. at 4717.
'Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 342 n.5 (9th Cir. 1972). The
Seventh Circuit had abrogated the Birnbaum Rule in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), noted in 31

& LEE L. REv. 757 (1974). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Eason, but
has apparently overruled its holding by the Blue Chip decision.
'See text accompanying note 47 infra.
WASH.

T

See Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),

cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970), which includes an extensive discussion of the exceptions to the Birnbaum Rule.
'James v. Gerber Products Co., 483 F.2d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 1973); Heyman v.
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cation of Birnbaum were recognized under circumstances involving
forced sales,' aborted purchases or sales,'" corporate antifraud derivative suits," and private injunctive actions.' 2 A fifth exception to
Birnbaum, which permitted beneficial owners of securities held by
trustees to sue parties purchasing from the trustee, emerged during
the past year. 3 In affirming Birnbaum, however, the Supreme Court
failed to indicate specifically if any of the recognized exceptions to
the strict purchaser-seller requirement could continue to be applied
by the federal courts. 4 Analysis of the Court's rationale in Blue Chip
indicates that at least some of these modifications of the purchaserseller requirement can no longer be judicially applied.
The Court based its affirmation of the Birnbaum Rule on three
grounds: judicial precedent, statutory history and construction, and
policy. 5 The Court's principal and most persuasive argument for
upholding the Birnbaum Rule rested upon the text and history of the
statute. Both Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, and Justice
Powell, concurring, pointed out that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 prohibit only activities "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."'" Further, they noted that
§ 3a(14) of the Act defined the term sale as including "any contract
to sell or otherwise dispose of" securities. 7 Thus, while holders of
puts, calls, options and other contractual rights or duties are protected as purchasers or sellers under the statute, the plaintiff in Blue
Chip, who was only a non-purchasing offeree of shares, did not meet
the statutory criteria for standing to sue. A judicial conclusion that
Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
'Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967).
"A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
"Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1970).
"Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
"3See cases cited in note 8 supra.
"In affirming the purchaser-seller requirement, the Court stated that "[tiaken
together with the precedential support for the Birnbaum rule over a period of more
than 20 years ... [we] conclude that it is a sound rule and should be followed." 43
U.S.L.W. at 4715. The Court made no direct mention of any of the modifications to
Birnbaum.
,Id.
"Id. at 4710, 4717.
"Id. at 4715, 4717. The Securities Exchange Act provides that "[tihe terms 'buy'
and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire," and
"[tihe terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
15 U.S.C. § 78c(13-14) (1970).
"8See note 3 supra.
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the plaintiff was similarly situated to persons clearly protected by the
statute was insufficient standing to maintain an action under § 10(b)
or Rule 10b-5.11
The Court's rejection of the practice of analogizing potential
plaintiffs to those claimants who meet the statutory requirements
forecloses absolutely any claims of standing by beneficial owners of
securities which are fraudulently sold. The Sixth Circuit in James v.
GerberProducts Co."'had allowed suit by a beneficial owner of securities who alleged fraud between the trustee-seller and defendantpurchaser of the plaintiffs securities. Although the plaintiff was not
strictly a seller, the court reasoned that she had the "interests of a
defacto seller" and that denial of standing would not promote the
inherent purpose of the Birnbaum Rule to limit litigation.2' Blue Chip
rejected this form of reasoning by analogy or reliance upon the purpose of the Birnbaum Rule as used by the James court for a strict
statutory test, emphasizing instead that a plaintiff must himself be
a purchaser or seller to sue under Rule 10b-5.22 Similarly, the forced
seller exception first proposed in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.2
appears to have been impliedly overruled by the Court.
The Vine court had granted standing to a plaintiff who alleged
fraud in the execution of a short form merger which left him a minority shareholder with a claim for cash against the newly formed corporation or the right to seek judicial appraisal of the value of his shares.
In either event, the court stated, the plaintiff would have to exchange
his shares for cash from the defendant, thus making him an eventual
forced seller. While it would be a clearer case of standing if the plaintiff had actually exchanged his shares for cash, the Vine court opined
that requiring him to do so was a needless formality." It is not so clear
after Blue Chip, on the other hand, whether tendering the shares
under similar circumstances remains merely a needless formality.
The Vine court found that the terms "otherwise acquire [dispose
of]" used in the statutory definitions of purchase and sale25 were
sufficiently broad to encompass a forced sale by short form merger."
"143 U.S.L.W. at 4716.
-483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973). The plaintiff in James claimed fraud between the
trustee and the defendant in the sale of trust shares at a low market price to provide
stock for Gerber's executive stock option plan.
11Id. at 948.
"43 U.S.L.W. at 4714.
-374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
21Id. at 634.
2

1See note 17 supra.
2374 F.2d at 634.
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But the Supreme Court's firm insistence upon an actual purchase or
sale in Blue Chip suggests that an actual tender or exchange of shares
will be required for forced sellers to sue under Rule 10b-5. Justice
Rehnquist emphasized:
The virtue of the Birnbaum rule, simply stated ... is that it
limits the class of plaintiffs to those who have at least dealt in
the security to which the prospectus, representation, or omission relates. 2
The Court's insistence upon the fact of actual dealing in corporate securities further limits the Birnbaum exceptions for corporate
derivative suits 8 and private injunctions under Rule 10b-5.11 The
majority opinion identified three classes of plaintiffs barred by the
Birnbaum Rule: potential purchasers of shares who failed to purchase
due to unduly gloomy representations; actual shareholders who failed
to sell because of excessively optimistic representations or nondisclosure of adverse information; and shareholders, creditors or other parties suffering loss due to corporate activities in connection with purchases or sales which violate Rule 10b-5. The latter two classes of
plaintiffs could circumvent Birnbaum by bringing a corporate derivative action if the corporation had been a purchaser or seller, stated
the Court, but the first class was precluded from relief under Rule
10b-5 by the purchaser-seller requirement. 0 Hence, the Court did not
abrogate the exception for derivative suits under Rule 10b-5 where
the corporation is a purchaser or seller.
Similarly, the corollary of this principle requires that private
plaintiffs be purchasers or sellers to enjoin continuing violations of
Rule 10b-5. While the Court noted that the Birnbaum Rule is inapplicable to the SEC when it sues to enjoin violations of the Rule,3 it
n43 U.S.L.W. at 4714.
2
3See note 11 supra.
"See note 12 supra.
3043 U.S.L.W. at 4711-12.
"1The Court cited its decision in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453
(1969), as establishing that the purchaser-seller requirement imposed no standing
limitation on the SEC when it sues for injunctive relief. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4716 n.14. The
Securities Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to seek an injunction against violations
of the Act or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e)(1970).
Although the SEC need not be a purchaser or seller to seek injunctive relief, it must
show fraud in connection with a purchase or sale to obtain an injunction under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. In National Securities, the Court held that an exchange of shares
under a merger plan constituted a sale which could be enjoined under the antifraud
provisions. 393 U.S. at 467.
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made no reference with regard to private plaintiff standing. The
Court's insistence on a transaction of purchase or sale by parties
seeking damages" leads to the conclusion that a similar requirement.
is requisite for private injunctive relief. Further, the Court's'explicit
rejection of analogizing parties meeting statutory criteria to similar
parties not meeting the same requisitesP also implies that plaintiffs
who are not purchasers or sellers under the statute will be unable to
seek injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5 in the future."' Thus, in cases
of derivative suits or private injunctive relief, the Court impliedly
required that private plaintiffs must assert some direct damage to
themselves through a purchase or sale transaction.
The final judicial exception to Birnbaum, however, involved
transactions in which an actual purchase or sale never occurred. This
exception, known as the aborted purchase or sale doctrine, was first
applied in A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow" when the plaintiff broker
alleged a fraudulent scheme by the defendant whereby he ordered
shares through the broker intending to pay for them only if the price
subsequently rose. When the price of the shares declined, the defendant refused to pay for the securities, forcing the broker-plaintiff to
sell the shares at a loss. The Brod court granted standing to the
plaintiff because he was clearly a purchaser of securities," albeit at
the fraudulent behest of the defendant. A later court, following the
aborted purchaser-seller doctrine, pointed out that in such instances
there was a contractual obligation between the plaintiff and the defendant to purchase or sell securities which was aborted by the alleged fraud of one of the partiesY Although there may be strictly no
purchase or sale of securities, the contractual relation between the
32

See text accompanying note 27 supra.

"Compare Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967).
The Mutual Shares court allowed a plaintiff to seek an injunction restraining alleged
manipulative practices intended to induce sale of shares to the defendant by stockholders. Reasoning that the SEC could seek an injunction, the court determined that the
plaintiff logically played a similar role in private enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act.
3
See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970). The Fifth Circuit permitted
the plaintiff in Herpich to maintain a corporate derivative suit seeking to restrain a
fraudulently induced merger. But because the corporation was the only party who had
purchased or sold securities, the action could be maintained derivatively on behalf of
the corporation. The court did not reach the issue whether the plaintiff, who was
neither a purchaser nor a seller, could maintain the action in his own right. Id. at 812.
'375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
3
"Id. at 397 n.3.
-Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1972).
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parties fulfills the statutory definition of purchase or sale," and
brings the plaintiff within the strict terms of the Birnbaum Rule as
upheld by the Supreme Court.
The common thread throughout the Court's Blue Chip opinion is
its insistence that plaintiffs meet the statutory requirements of purchaser or seller for standing to obtain under the Securities Exchange
Act. The Court did not address the issue of retaining the modifications to Birnbaum, and its strict statutory approach to the purchaserseller requirement militates against a flexible approach to this standing requisite. 9 Hence, those modifications which meet the statutory
criteria-derivative suits and injunctive actions when the corporation
is a purchaser or seller, and aborted transactions-may continue to
be applied by the courts. Situations where the plaintiff is not a purchaser or seller within the statutory definitions, in particular the
forced seller exception, will no longer support a cause of action under
Rule 10b-5.
Although the majority also relied upon policy reasons to bolster
its conclusion, the better course for lower courts in the future will be
to apply the statutory limitations to potential plaintiffs and not to
promulgate new exceptions which may still meet Birnbaum's policy
of limiting litigation by not significantly expanding the class of potential litigants.
But beyond the immediate impact of Blue Chip upon the
purchaser-seller requirement, the decision further portends a less
benign judicial attitude towards Rule 10b-5. The policy arguments
for strict application of the Birnbaum Rule pronounced by Justice
Rehnquist centered around the possible use of Rule 10b-5 as a fountainhead for strike suits against issuer or corporate defendants. Such
suits, the Court noted, have a settlement value to the plaintiff far out
of proportion to the probability of success after trial on the merits
when claims could successfully resist a motion to dismiss or summary
judgment. Once the claim reached the trial stage, there would be no
objective fact of purchase or sale by which the plaintiff's injury could
be measured. Thus, in the Court's opinion, recovery might be had
based solely upon the plaintiff's own oral testimony that he would
have purchased securities if the alleged misrepresentation or omission had not occurred." Under such circumstances,
'See note 17 supra.

"9While the Court characterized the purchaser-seller requirement as an issue of
standing, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4717, it apparently did not use the term in the constitutional
sense. Compare Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1970).
4043 U.S.L.W. at 4712-15.
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. . bystanders to the securities marketing process could
await developments on the sidelines without risk, claiming
that inaccuracies in disclosure caused nonselling in a falling
market and that unduly pessimistic predictions by the issuer
followed by a rising market caused them to allow retrospectively golden opportunities to pass.41
*

Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion which accused the
majority of a "preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being
and a seeming callousness toward the investing public."42 The essential test for Rule 10b-5 claims, the dissent asserted, should be "the
showing of a logical nexus between the alleged fraud and the sale or
purchase of a security."4 Thus, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Douglas and Brennan, would have continued expansive application
of Rule 10b-5, looking more to the nature or impact of the alleged
fraud, rather than follow the statute-bound analysis of the majority.
Regardless of the merits of either the majority or dissenting viewpoint, the most significant ramification of Blue Chip is that the Court
has chosen to establish some limits upon Rule 10b-5 rights of action.
One recent commentator had noted that the Birnbaum Rule remained one of the few fixed boundaries limiting the field of Rule 10b5 claims. The Court has apparently chosen to circumscribe the Rule
by the purchaser-seller requirement with draconian decisiveness.
Rule 10b-5 does not encompass all potential securities fraud claimants, and the Court acknowledged that some otherwise meritorious
claims must be relegated to non-federal forums for redress.45 Hence,
further changes in the plaintiff class protected by Rule 10b-5 or §
10(b) must come from Congressional amendment of the law, not from
the courts."
The Court's unwillingness to expand further the limits of Rule
10b-5 may soon be carried into other securities fraud elements. The
Court has granted certiorari to consider whether the Rule proscribes
negligent as well as deceptive conduct. Fortunately, the Blue Chip
"Id. at 4714.
"Id. at 4719.
"id.
at 4721.
"Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167 (Special Issue
1974).
'043 U.S.L.W. at 4712 n.9.
"'The SEC cannot amend Rule 10b-5 to modify the purchaser-seller requirement,
as any extension beyond the statutory authority for such a rule would be an ultravires
exercise of Commission powers.
t
See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), petitionfor cert.
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decision scrupulously avoided unnecessary dictum with regards to
other areas of the antifraud provisions. How the Court may resolve
the scienter issue under Rule 10b-5 on much less firm statutory
ground than available with the purchaser-seller requirement is a matter of conjecture. 8 For the present, however, Birnbaum stands as the
most rigorous barrier to the plaintiffs right of action under Rule 10b5.
B.

Scienter

Rule 10b-5 does not impose strict liability upon violators; plaintiffs must prove sufficient culpability, commonly referred to as scienter,' to recover under the Rule. The federal circuits differ on the
minimum degree of scienter necessary for liability, but two distinct
standards, negligence and recklessness,2 have emerged.3 During the
granted,43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. April 14, 1975) (No. 74-1042). See also text accompanying notes 25-63 at 757-63.
""Section 10 (b) was one of the least controversial parts of the 1934 Act." 1 A.
BROMBERO, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD, SEC RULE 10b-5 § 2.2(300), at 331 (1973). One of
the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act, Thomas G. Corcoran, characterized the
provision as a catch-all clause designed to prevent manipulative devices. Id. The
history of the promulgation of Rule 10b-5 is similarly obscure as to whether or not the
Rule was intended to encompass negligence as well as fraudulent and deceptive conduct. See Conference on Codificationof the FederalSecurities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793,
922 (1967).
See generally 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrriEs LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5 § 8.4
(1973) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERO]. The term scienter, as used in securities fraud
litigation, does not have the common law meaning of conscious intent to defraud. See,
e.g., Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970). Scienter, when used in this context can mean negligence, recklessness, knowledge or intent. See notes 2-3 infra.
2 Negligence is the least degree of fault which will allow recovery in some of the
federal circuits. See note 3 infra. Negligence is generally characterized as a lack of due
diligence or unreasonable conduct. Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 545, 549 (D.
Md. 1971). Recklessness, the next higher degree of culpability, is defined as failure or
refusal to ascertain material facts when readily available. Cohen v. Franchard Corp.,
478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). Recklessness is the lowest
scienter standard which will permit recovery in all circuits which have considered the
issue. See note, 3 infra. The two increasingly more culpable states of mind are knowledge and intent to defraud. See also 2 BROMBERG § 8.4 (500).
I Until recently the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits were believed to
allow recovery upon proof of negligence. The Second and Fifth Circuits, on the other
hand, required proof of at least recklessness. Many of the older circuit court cases that
explained the different standards were tabulated for comparison in Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 312-16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972),
and Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 598 (1972). See also
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 761 (5th Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit, while
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past year, two circuits which formerly were believed to apply a negligence standard abandoned it for stricter tests of culpability.
In White v. Abrams,4 the Ninth Circuit disavowed any single minimum scienter requirement and proposed instead the application of
a flexible duty standard. Rejecting a single scienter test as unworkable, the White court measured culpability in terms of the degree of
duty imposed upon the defendant by Rule 10b-5 coupled with the
defendant's state of mind.' The court suggested that in certain circumstances negligence may constitute the appropriate scienter standard,' while in other cases intentional conduct may be necessary for
recovery. For example, the court stated that when the securities laws
impose high duties of care and diligence upon the defendant, negligence should constitute sufficient culpability. On the other hand,
when the law does not impose a high standard of conduct on the
defendant, more than negligent conduct must be proved for recovery.'
Hence, the appropriate scienter standard for securities fraud cases in
the Ninth Circuit may be either stricter or more lenient than that
utilized by other circuits, depending on the duty formulation applied
declining to determine a minimum stanard, recently indicated that actual knowledge
would constitute sufficient scienter. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d
Cir. 1974).
One commentator has noted that although some circuits claim to impose liability
for negligence, either directly or by implication, no appellate court has yet done so in
a private damage action. Bucklo, supra at 590. But see Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,
503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr.
14, 1975) (No. 74-1042).
495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974), noted in 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 99 (1975).
The court suggested five factors to be considered in formulating the degree of duty
to be imposed on the defendant: (1) the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff;
(2) the defendant's access to information as compared to the plaintiff's access; (3) the
benefit the defendant derives from the relationship; (4) the defendant's awareness that
the plaintiff would rely on his advice; (5) the defendant's role in initiating the transaction. 495 F.2d at 735-36.
1 White did not use the term negligence to characterize the culpability standard
imposed under conditions of high duty and good faith owed to the plaintiff. Two courts
interpreting White have stated that negligence will suffice for liability. In re U.S.
Financial Securities Litigation, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,844 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11,
1974) (negligence under certain circumstances); Little v. First California Co., CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,745 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1974) (implying negligence sufficient in
all circumstances). The former opinion properly interpreted the flexible duty standard.
The Little court probably misinterpreted White by implying that negligence would
suffice under all circumstances. See 495 F.2d at 734. See also Marx v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp.
71 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
7 495 F.2d at 736.
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by the trial court.' In essence, however, White represents a movement
toward stricter requirements of culpability, since it rejects the universal application of a minimum negligence standard.
A more decisive rejection of the negligence standard was made by
the Tenth Circuit in Clegg v. Conk,' which, in the opinion, of the
court, corrected the "prevalent misunderstanding" among authorities and commentators over that circuit's minimum scienter criteria.
The Clegg court stated that "there is required something additional
by way of scienter or conscious fault than mere negligence," in order
to impose liability under Rule 10b-5. 10 While prior Tenth Circuit
courts had implied a negligence standard or strict liability under the
Rule, the circuit had never actually imposed liability for innocent or
negligent violations. 1 The culpability standard announced by the
Clegg court thus merely realigned the stated scienter test with the
actual prior practice of that circuit. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit's
explicit rejection of strict liability or a negligence standard under any
circumstances was an even stronger indicium of a trend towards
stricter culpability requirements under Rule 10b-5 than the White
court's qualified rejection of a negligence criterion. 2
Repudiation of a negligence standard by the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits suggests that courts which have previously relied upon the
I Whether the flexible duty standard will prove workable remains to be seen. Only
one case has applied the standard. Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal.
1974). See Note, The Development of a FlexibleDuty Standardof Liability Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 99 (1975); cf. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503
F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 14,
1975) (No. 74-1042).
507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3659 (June 16, 1975).
" Id. at 1361 (footnote omitted).
" The Clegg court reviewed extensively all earlier Tenth Circuit cases involving
scienter and Rule 10b-5 and concluded that liability had never been imposed for simple
negligence not involving some fraudulent purpose or species of scienter stricter than
negligence. 507 F.2d at 1362. The court is correct in this conclusion. While in Stevens
v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965), the circuit court had stated "[ijt is only
necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of
a fact or the omission to state a material fact" to recover under Rule 10b-5, the facts
of the case demonstrated knowledge by the defendant. See also Financial Indus. Fund,
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874
(1973).
22 Only two circuits would presently impose liability for negligent violations of Rule
10b-5 under all circumstances. See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th
Cir. 1974), petition for cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 741042); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
852 (1970). See also note 13 infra.
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now discredited authority from those circuits should either reexamine
the Rule 10b-5 culpability standard in light of recent developments
or clearly articulate the basis and scope of liability for negligence
under the Rule.13 Whether negligence is the appropriate minimum
standard of scienter has not been definitively resolved by the courts,
but White and Clegg evidence a clear trend away from that standard.
C. Duties of Inquiry and Disclosure-Attorney and Accountant
Liability for Negligence
Liability under Rule 10b-5 is not limited to persons who directly
participate in a fraudulent scheme. Secondary defendants, known as
aider-abettors, may be held liable for their assistance to the primary
wrongdoer.' Although the distinction between primary and secondary
defendants is not always clear, aiding-abetting requires intent to further a scheme to defraud, or knowledge of such a scheme, coupled
with substantial assistance to the primary wrongdoer. 2 Substantial
assistance may be given by active participation in the scheme,3 or by
inaction if the secondary defendant is a person upon whom special
responsibilities are imposed by the securities laws.4 The knowledge
11Both White and Clegg have either overruled or seriously limited application of
earlier circuit decisions which had supposedly established a negligence standard. See
Stevens v. Vowell, supra note 11; Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th
Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). All three cases have been
heavily relied upon by other courts to establish a negligence standard. E.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,400 U.S. 852 (1970); Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967); cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
1 See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,In Pari Delicto, Indemnification,and Contribution,120
U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder]; see also Lowenfels, Expanding
Responsibilitiesof Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standardof
Care and Prioritiesof Duties, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 412 (1974).
2 See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681-82 (N.D.
Ind. 1966), 286 F. Supp. 702, 728 (N.D. Ind. 1968), af'd, 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Rosen v. Dick, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,786
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1974), Ruder at 620. Professor Bromberg has also distinguished
aiding-abetting from primary liability on the basis of a lesser degree of participation
or importance of the acts performed. 2 A. BROMBERG, SEculmEs LAW: FRAUD, SEC
RULE 10b-5, § 8.5(515) (1973) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]. See, e.g., SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1097 (2d Cir. 1972).
E.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 728 (N.D.
Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970);
Rosen v. Dick, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,786 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1974).
1 The Brennan series of cases, see cases cited in note 2 supra, imply that liability
for inaction may result where there is a special duty imposed on the aider-abettor to
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criterion has been expressed as a requirement of culpability or scienter and has been defined in terms of negligence, recklessness, and
knowledge or intent to further the fraudulent conduct.' In private
actions, secondary liability has generally been imposed upon proof of
actual knowledge of the fraudulent scheme.' On the other hand, negligence has satisfied the culpability requirement in SEC enforcement
actions. However, the culpability standards applied in either type of
action have not distinguished between active or passive assistance.
The failure of federal courts to recognize a dichotomy between
active and inactive assistance by aider-abettors was remedied during
the past year. Courts began to distinguish active from passive participation with regard to the different culpability standards used to determine liability in both private and enforcement actions.8
Standards for Injunctive Relief
The most abrupt departure from prior case law was in the area of
SEC enforcement suits. In SEC v. Coffey' the Sixth Circuit withdrew
a district court injunction against two alleged aider-abettors charged
with negligently violating Rule 10b-5. The circuit court rejected the
SEC's contention that mere negligence was sufficient for injunctive
report violations of Rule 10b-5. 259 F. Supp. at 681-82. The question of liability where
only inaction is involved was reserved on appeal by the circuit court. 417 F.2d at 155.
The Second Circuit, however, has apparently adopted the inaction-duty theory as a
basis for liability, provided other requisites of culpability are proved. See Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1302-03 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Pettit v. American Stock
Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
See note 2 at 750.
See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1302-03 (2d Cir. 1973) (no
liability for inaction where defendant had no knowledge of the scheme); Rosen v. Dick,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,786 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1974) (allegations of knowledge and
active assistance state a claim).
I See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d'535 (2d Cir. 1973), noted in 87 HARv.
L. REv. 1860 (1974); 34 MD.L. REv. 327 (1974).
8 See text accompanying notes 10-12, 24-26 infra.
9 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3416 (Jan. 27, 1975).
The case involved alleged misrepresentations to secure a loan from the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Fund. The corporation, King Resources, employed Crofters, Inc.
as a "money finder" to arrange loans from the state of Ohio. Crofters obtained a prime
commercial paper credit rating for King Resources from the National Credit Office.
Appellant King was board chairman of King Resources, and appellant Coffey was its
financial vice-president. The SEC claimed that King Resources bad failed to disclose
adverse material facts about its financial condition to the state of Ohio and the National Credit Office. Almost all negotiations for the credit rating were conducted by
the money finder, Crofters. The only major action of either appellant was communication between Coffey and the National Credit Office.
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relief and instead required a showing of willful or reckless disregard
for the truth. A dual-level standard was implied by the court: where
the aider-abettor actively assisted the securities fraud scheme, knowing participation was requisite to enjoining the defendant; conversely, when assistance was by inaction only, then conscious intent
to aid the violation of Rule 10b-5 was necessary.'"
In refusing to apply a negligence standard to aider-abettors, the
Coffey court explcitly rejected a recent holding by the Second Circuit." In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. 12the Second Circuit applied a negligence standard in an enforcement action against an attorney who had
prepared an opinion letter used to sell unregistered stock. This decision was a case of first impression whereby an attorney, acting in his
professional capacity, was found enjoinable as an aider-abettor to
securities fraud. The court justified its use of a negligence standard
on the basis of the attorney's special responsibilities under the securities laws and the unquestionable reliable which the investing public
must place on legal opinion letters.' 3
Spectrum was the first case in which a court unequivocally applied a negligence standard in an enforcement proceeding against an
0 Appellant King's conduct consisted primarily of inaction. See 493 F.2d at 1316.
Appellant Coffey, on the other hand, was either a primary participant or an active
aider-abettor based on his providing information to the National Credit Office. Id. The
Coffey court did not precisely explain the reason for applying different standards to
each defendant, but the distinction made in the text is substantiated by a careful
reading of the decision.
" The Coffey court rejected the negligence standard applied in SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), as not applicable in the case before it. 493 F.2d at
1316 n.30. The Sixth Circuit found Spectrum correct on its facts, but nevertheless
established a knowledge test to enjoin aiding-abetting. Id. at 1316.
The Seventh Circuit in SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974), explicitly
rejected the injunctive relief standards applied by the Coffey court. The Dolnick court
granted injunctive relief against a securities salesman who had knowingly sold unregistered securities in violation of Rule 10b-5. The court stated that defendant Dolnick was
at least an aider-abetter to securities fraud, although from the facts he could have been
a primary participant as well. Noting the enforcement standard of liability used in
Coffey was willful or reckless disregard for the truth, the Dolnick court rejected the
standard as "inconsistent with the law of this circuit." Id. at 1284, citing SEC v. Van
Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966). The Dolnick court apparently misinterpreted
Coffey, citing Coffey's injunction standard for primary defendants, rather than the
aider-abettor standard of knowledge or intent.
12 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
,1 The Second Circuit had noted previously that attorneys have a duty to investigate the accuracy of a prospectus and may not rely blindly on information obtained
from a client which is apparently misleading. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1968).
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aider-abettor. Application of a negligence standard to aider-abettors
was a logical extension of prior case law holding negligence sufficient
to enjoin primary violators. The Coffey court, on the other hand,
specifically refused to apply a negligence standard to either active or
passive aiding-abetting. The court reasoned that proof of knowledge
or intent to assist the fraud, rather than lesser proof requirements
involved in negligence, was necessary to guard against imposition of
liability for innocent omissions or non-culpable inaction.,5
The rationale and conclusion of the Coffey court can be criticized
on three grounds. First, a negligence standard does not impose liability upon innocent or non-culpable parties, since negligence requires
a finding of fault on the defendant's part." Second, an increased
standard of care is usually applied to persons with special responsibilities under the securities laws. This reasoning was persuasive to the
Spectrum court, since it applied the negligence standard to an attorney experienced in securities law.'. Similarly, the defendants in
Coffey, as corporate officers, arguably had a duty to be aware of
corporate activities which might involve securities fraud. Application
of a negligence standard would promote conscientious and diligent
performance of officers' duties. 8 Third, the Coffey court's refusal to
apply a negligence standard in an enforcement action may result in
confusion similar to that which currently prevails due to the variety
of scienter standards applied by circuit courts in private damage
actions." The Supreme Court's decision not to hear the Coffey case"0
leaves the circuit courts free to apply varying culpability requirements as prerequisites to grants of injunctive relief against aiderabettors.
Despite the discrepancy in the conclusions reached by the
1 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1092 (2d Cir.
1972), and cases cited therein. The rationale for a negligence standard is that since no
monetary damages are involved, the penalties are minimal. See SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 865 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
Is 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3416 (Jan. 27,
1975).
,S Cf. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (liability without fault rejected; negligence may suffice for liability in some cases). Other courts have, however,
rejected on policy grounds a negligence standard for private actions. See, e.g., Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
See text accompanying note 13 supra.
" Absence of monetary liability in injunctive actions ameliorates the impact of
the injunction. See note 14 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 2-3 at 750.
43 U.S.L.W. 3416 (Jan. 27, 1975).
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Spectrum and Coffey courts, the cases focused upon two factors receiving increasing judicial scrutiny in connection with the formulation of culpability standards. These are the nature of the assistance
rendered by the aider-abettor and his status as a professional or person with special duties under the securities laws. Both courts considered these two factors highly important, although the standards
which were finally applied lack uniformity or consistent correlation
with the suggested factors. "'
Private Liability for Aiding-Abetting
Recent private actions further indicate that federal courts are
increasingly sensitive to the distinctions between active and inactive
aiding-abetting, and are willing to impose stricter standards of liability upon certain classes of secondary defendants. For example, in
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange22 the Seventh Circuit applied
a dual-level test analogous to the one used in Coffey. The Midwest
Stock Exchange case involved claims of aiding-abetting arising from
negligent supervision of a securities broker and the subsequent failure
to detect his fraudulent practices. The court concluded that where
inaction was involved, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
had, or but for a breach of his duty of inquiry would have had,
knowledge of the fraud.? On the other hand, for active aidingabetting, the court stated that negligence is the appropriate standard.? In a companion case, Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,5 the Seventh Circuit subsequently amplified the standard applied to inactive
2, Compare SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (attorney gave
active assistance; negligence standard), with SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3416 (Jan. 27, 1975) (corporate officers, active and
inactive assistance; knowledge or intent standard).
" 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
2 503 F.2d at 374.
24 "Absent proof of negligence, we will not stand in willingness to impose a standard of strict liability on Midwest due to its issuance of the [membership] plaque."
Id. at 375. The plaintiff maintained that issuance of a membership plaque by the
exchange was aiding-abetting by affirmative action.
The decision to apply a negligence standard to active aiding-abetting is consistent

with earlier Seventh Circuit decisions which applied the same standard to primary
participants. See, e.g., Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir.
1972). Compare Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (alleged aidingabetting by inaction; no liability for negligence); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,

Horwath &Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (aiding-abetting by affirmative
acts; liability based on willful, deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth).
- 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. granted,43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S.
Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 74-1042).
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aiding and abetting announced in Midwest Stock Exchange.
Ernst & Ernst involved a suit against an independent auditing
firm for aiding and abetting securities fraud by inaction. Defendant
Ernst & Ernst had failed to investigate an office rule regarding the
opening of the primary wrongdoer's mail." The plaintiff maintained
that this "mail rule" was a material inadequacy in internal accounting controls which the defendant was under a duty of inquiry to
investigate." Ernst & Ernst's failure to investigate and report the
mail rule allegedly violated generally accepted standards of accounting procedure 8 and thus aided and abetted a violation of Rule 10b-5.
The court suggested that a five-step test be used to establish a prima
facie case of aiding-abetting. A claim could be made by demonstrating that: (1) the defendant had a duty of inquiry; (2) the plaintiff was
a beneficiary of the duty of inquiry; (3) the defendant breached his
duty of inquiry; (4) concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry
the defendant breached a duty of disclosure; (5) there existed a causal
connection between the breached duties of inquiry and disclosure and
the underlying fraud. 9 The Ernst & Ernst court relied on the Midwest
Stock Exchange case to support this standard, but with one subtle
distinction. While Midwest Stock Exchange used a knowledge criterion for inactive aiding-abetting," Ernst & Ernst suggested that negligence was the proper standard. The court noted that if an auditor
breached his duty of inquiry through lack of due care he concomitantly breached his duty of disclosure." Thus, the Seventh Circuit
held that the auditors could be liable for negligent failure to detect
material inadequacies and, since such inadequacies were unknown to
32
them, full disclosure was impossible.
21 The "mail rule" provided that all mail personally addressed to the primary
wrongdoer would only be opened by him. The mail was allowed to accumulate unopened when he was absent from the office. The primary wrongdoer corresponded with
his defrauded clients through the mails, and the scheme would have been discovered
by reading his mail. 503 F.2d at 1109.
v Id.

u 503 F.2d at 1108.

503 F.2d at 1110. The court suggested that the test was a flexible standard of
liability, Id. at 1104, but failed to indicate whether the factors themselves or the
standard applied would vary depending on the factors present in any particular case.
Cf. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
0 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
31 503 F.2d at 1114. See also note 32 infra.
3 This is the logic of Ernst & Ernst. 503 F.2d at 1104. A duty to investigate
necessarily implies any material inadequacy will be disclosed. Failure to discover
material omissions or misrepresentations where the defendant is under a duty of inquiry concomitantly breaches the duty of disclosure. Id. at 1114. This reasoning appar-
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Ernst & Ernst establishes that public accountants will be held to
higher standards of conduct Under Rule 10b-5 than some corporate
officers." The scope of the duty of inquiry will be limited to factors
which must be disclosed under generally accepted accounting stanwill be simple neglidards, but the required degree of culpability
34
gence, even for passive aiding-abetting.
Although the Seventh Circuit's decision was the first to unequivocally impose liability for negligence on aider-abettors, a recent district court case from the Second Circuit reached a similar result. An
auditor's report which failed to qualify and report adequately a transaction in a statement used to place securities privately was found
materially misleading by the court in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath.3 The qualified auditor's report did not
convey a true picture of the nature of the transaction which had been
executed to create paper assets for the corporation, and thus was
misleading to investors." Noting that public accountants traditionally have a duty to the public, the court stated that the auditor had
an affirmative duty to disclose facts material to a securities transaction." The judicial inquiry was not whether the report satisfied "esoteric accounting norms," but whether the report presented a fair and
true financial picture.38 The court also phrased the prerequisite elements of liability in terms of materiality, disclosure duty, scienter,
ently imposes a negligence standard on parties with a duty of inquiry under Rule 10b5. The court also imposed a burden of proof on the plaintiff to show a causal connection
between the breach of duty of inquiry or disclosure and facilitation of the fraud. Id. at
1115. Apparently the plaintiff must show that an investigation would have uncovered
the fraud and so required its disclosure.
11 Compare SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3416 (Jan. 27, 1975) (corporate officers enjoinable for aiding-abetting only
on showing of knowledge or intent), and Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1973) (corporate director not liable for negligent inaction).
3 The Ernst & Ernst case may thus impliedly overrule a part of the Midwest Stock
Exchange case. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
m Id. at 125.
3 Accord, Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104-05 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
But see Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971). In Wessel, an independent
auditor was sued as an aider-abettor to securities fraud. The court denied liability,
stating, "We find nothing in Rule 10b-5 that purports to impose liability on anyone
whose conduct consists solely of inaction." Id. at 283. This holding apparently contradicts the inaction-duty standard of liability. However, it is limited by the facts that
the false financial statements were not prepared in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities, and were further altered without the auditor's knowledge before
inclusion in the false prospectus.
31 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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reliance and damages. 39 The culpability standard for failure to discover the omissions or misrepresentations was willful, deliberate or
reckless disregard for the truth which would be the equivalent of
knowledge. 0 The Herzfeld court's definition of culpability, the standard of duty of inquiry, and the elements of a claim thus apparently
differed from the criteria used by the Ernst & Ernst court.
While the Ernst & Ernst court used a negligence standard of culpability, Herzfeld required a showing of knowledge. The distinction
can be attributed to the different scienter standards applied by the
Seventh and Second Circuits.4 The standard applied by each court
did not distinguish between active and passive assistance by the
secondary defendant, thereby contradicting the dichotomy suggested
in the Midwest Stock Exchange case. Nevertheless, while the
Herzfeld court's knowledge standard included liability for a reckless
failure to discover fraudulent conduct, and is thus distinguishable
from negligence, the application of such a standard to circumstances
involving independent auditors may reach negligence. 2
In terms of the standard applied to the adequacy of disclosure,
Ernst & Ernst followed the generally accepted standards of the accounting profession. The Herzfeld court, on the other hand, used a
standard which required that the report present a fair and true picture to investors.43 The fair and true standard appears more ambiguous than the test of Ernst & Ernst, although in application the standards used by each court may coincide in effect and result despite the
distinction made by the courts.44 Both decisions do, nevertheless,
establish some guidelines for defining the persons subject to special
duties under the securities acts and the standards which will be applied to them.
Public accountants most clearly have a duty to inquire into matters affecting the reliability and integrity of financial records, 5 and
n Compare the elements suggested by the Ernst & Ernst court at text accompanying note 29 supra.
11378 F. Supp. at 126.
" See cases cited in note 24 supra.

See text accompanying notes 59-62 infra.
See text accompanying note 38 supra.
" Accepted standards of accounting are not always unambiguous, however.
Whether the "mail rule" in Ernst & Ernst was a material inadequacy in internal
accounting controls which required disclosure was an issue of fact to be resolved at
trial, thereby requiring remand. 503 F.2d at 1111. The Herzfeld standard of whether
the report presents a fair and true financial picture, see text accompanying note 40
supra, is an inherently more ambiguous standard as less reliance will be placed upon
the accounting profession's own standards.
,1 The basis for the auditor's duty, both at common law and as imposed by the
42

41
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this duty runs to the public as well as to the client." Corporate insiders also have been held to have duties of disclosure if they trade in
securities on inside information." Similarly, members of the SEC
have stated publicly that securities lawyers have duties running not
only to their clients, but to the investing public at large." How far
the class of persons subject to special duties under the securities laws
might extend beyond insiders and professionals has not yet been the
subject of extensive judicial comment.49
Once the class of persons with special duties under the securities
laws has been defined, a court must also determine exactly what
duties will be imposed upon the defendant. Two distinct duties were
imposed by both the Herzfeld and Ernst & Ernst courts: a duty of
inquiry and a duty of disclosure. Each duty presents a different compliance problem for potential defendants. The extent of the duty of
inquiry at present is ambiguous. 0 Whether an office mail rule in the
Ernst & Ernst case was a material inadequacy in internal accounting
controls constituted a major question before the court." Similar dusecurities statutes and professional standards, was extensively discussed by the Ernst
& Ernst court. 503 F.2d at 1105-11.
4 See, e.g., Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104-05 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
For an explanation of recent developments in accountants' common law liabilities for
negligence, see Gormley, Accountants' ProfessionalLiability-A Ten Year Review, 29
Bus. LAw. 1205 (1974).

11Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974) (corporate president was aider-abettor; required to disclose what he knew); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (anyone in
possession of material inside information must disclose it or abstain from trading in
such securities).
11Members of the SEC have urged that the securities lawyer has duties to the
investing public to insure that all material facts in a securities transaction are fully
and fairly disclosed. See Statement of SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, 29 Bus. LAw. 7, 12
(Special Issue 1974); Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of The Securities
Lawyer, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,631 (1974).
11See cases cited at note 47 supra. See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1974) (stockbroker liable for breach
of duty of disclosure to all persons in the open market without knowledge of material
inside information possessed by defendant).
5 See note 44 supra. See also Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973)
(outside director not participating in fraudulent transaction not liable for negligent
failure to detect fraud); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968) (lawyer cannot
knowingly assist in circulating false statements because his client furnished them; but
he does not commit fraud by failure to detect technical mistakes beyond his competence).
51503 F.2d at 1111. The court defined a material inadequacy as a condition allowing someone to perpetrate errors or irregularities in accounting records, and concluded
that the issue of whether the "mail rule" was a per se inadequacy in internal account-

762

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

ties of inquiry have been applied to attorneys with regard to information given to them in connection with a securities transaction. 2 However, the question of whether or not a specific fact is material and
thus requires further investigation frequently will be answered by
guesswork or speculation in view of the myriad facts which become
3
known to the auditor or lawyer in the course of his employment.
The concomitant duty of disclosure suggests even more troublesome problems for accountants and lawyers. Once the potential
aider-abettor learns of either actual or suspected violations, he must
disclose them or face liability.54 However, no judicial authority has
suggested how and to whom disclosure should be made, whether in a
public forum or to the SEC. 5 Some commentators have suggested
that lawyers and auditors do possess significant power in advising on
securities transactions: a qualified or withheld opinion letter will
probably abort the entire transaction." However, when the qualifying
material facts are brought to light in the later stages of a transaction,57 or the disputed fact is one over which minds could reasonably
differ, the attorney may of necessity choose his client's position."
ing controls was best resolved at trial. Id. But the court then declined to find that the
auditor had a duty to inquire into compliance with NASD rules. Id. at 1111-14.
52 See SEC v. Frank. 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
The Ernst & Ernst court did not find the "mail rule" automatically material.
See notes 44, 51 supra. The extent of the lawyer's duty to investigate information
provided to him by his client has been vaguely defined. See note 13 supra.
5 See note 32 supra.
Primary defendants violate Rule 10b-5 by trading on material inside information without disclosing it to the investing public. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1974). Such disclosure would
probably be in breach of a confidential or fiduciary duty under common law. Aiderabettors do not have the option to abstain from trading and avoid liability for nondisclosure. When the independent violation occurs, aider-abettors may become automatically liable for failure to disclose. See also Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilitiesof Attorneys in Practice before the SEC, 25 MERCER L. REv. 637, 667 (1974).
5 See Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the FederalSecurities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (1973).
11This was the situation in the NationalStudent Marketing case, where adverse
material facts were not revealed until just prior to closing the transaction. The lawyers
issued opinion letters stating that all necessary steps to consummate the merger were
valid and that no federal or state law had been violated, rather than disclose the new
information and resolicit approval from shareholders of the corporations involved. See
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972) (complaint filed).
The lawyer may also terminate his employment by his client. The ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility has some suggestions. A lawyer may refuse to participate
in conduct he believes to be unlawful, even though there is legal support for the course
of action. Disciplinary Rule 7-101(B)(2) [hereinafter D.R.]. A lawyer shall not counsel
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Courts speak of liability in terms of duties to investigate and
disclose material information in securities transactions. This language appears to imply a uniform negligence standard at least for
lawyers and accountants who aid and abet securities fraud. The Ernst
& Ernst court was clear on one point: if an auditor breached his duty
of inquiry through lack of due care, he simultaneously breached his
duty of disclosure.59 This is an indication that at least the Seventh
Circuit would impose liability for a negligent failure to detect and
disclose fraud." Similarly, although denying that liability will be
imposed for negligent conduct under Rule 10b-5, the Herzfeld court
approaches that result." However, to conclude that a negligence standard will generally be applied to this class of aider-abettors would be
misleading.2 Use of a negligence standard in private litigation involving aiding-abetting represents a departure from the judicial trend
towards requiring more than negligent conduct to impose liability
upon primary defendants. The result in extreme cases will be anomor assist his client in conduct which is illegal or fraudulent, D.R. 7-102(A)(7), and the
attorney must disclose fraudulent conduct by his client when the information is unprivileged. Rule 7-102(B)(1). The attorney may withdraw from employment where his
client seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct, D.R. 2-110(C)(1)(b), or his client
insists he pursue an illegal course of conduct, D.R. 2-110(C)(1)(c). The lawyer may
reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime. D.R. 4-101(C)(3). The disciplinary rules are not completely clear
on the extent of the attorney's duties; neither will they be helpful when the situation
facing the attorney is less than unequivocally illegal.
11503 F.2d at 1114. See also note 34 supra.
See note 32 supra.

Although the auditor had knowledge of the fraudulent transaction in Herzfeld,
the court would hold an auditor liable for failure to discover misrepresentations or
omissions amounting to willful, deliberate, or reckless disregard for the truth. The
recklessness standard as applied by the Second Circuit includes failure or refusal to
ascertain and disclose material facts when readily available and there are reasonable
grounds to believe they exist. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). This recklessness, or inquiry-notice standard is
important for an accountant who will be aware of many such facts. If he should ignore
one material fact, such as the "mail rule" in Ernst & Ernst, then arguably there is a
reckless violation. Under such circumstances the distinction between recklessness and
negligence almost disappears.
12 In contrast, the Second Circuit has rejected a negligence standard with regard
to both primary and secondary defendants. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir. 1973). Ernst & Ernst is the first private damage suit to impose a negligence
standard in a case where the facts demonstrate only a negligent violation of Rule 10b5, and not knowing or reckless conduct. Compare Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc.,
455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972) (negligence standard used to determine statute of
limitations).
0 See text accompanying notes 12-13 at 752-53.
"
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alous as primary wrongdoers could conceivably be subjected to lesser
standards of due care than their accountant or attorney aiderabettors.
Conclusion
The developments of the past year are not completely clear in
establishing standards to be applied to aider-abettors in securities
fraud cases. It is evident, however, that courts are in fact applying
different standards of culpability based upon the active or passive
nature of the aiding-abetting. In particular, greater culpability will
be required where assistance is by inaction rather than action. 4 Persons with special responsibilities under the securities acts, professionals who trade securities and advise or audit securities traders, will be
held to higher standards of conduct than their non-professional counterparts." The standards imposed upon professionals are now approaching a negligence theory of liability, perhaps without regard for
a distinction between active and passive aiding-abetting.6 This development in the law of aiding-abetting violations of Rule 10b-5
places these professionals in the difficult, if not impossible, position
of evaluating all information that comes to their attention for its
potential fraudulent aspects. Perhaps the only evaluation criteria
under these circumstances was given by Judge Friendly in his comment that these decisions will be "judged in the bright gleam of
hindsight." 7
D. Damages
In the computation of damages in securities fraud cases, federal
courts generally have followed either the out-of-pocket measure, or a
rescission theory.2 The former measure permits recovery of the difference between the fair value of the securities at the time of the fraduSee text accompanying notes 9-10, 22-24 supra.
e See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
68 See text accompanying notes 59-62 and note 32 supra.But see text accompany"

ing notes 22-25 supra.
67 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also 2 BROMBERG § 8.5(533) at
208.25.
1 See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 743 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968); Janigan v. Taylor 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
879 (1965).
2
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lent transfer and the actual consideration paid.3 Rescission of the
transfer produces essentially the same result,4 but the fact that the
parties are returned to the status quo suggests that any increases in
the value of the securities during the interim between the sale and
the remedy will inure to the defrauded seller.5 Thus, the distinction
between the two theories of recovery is minimal.
The only Supreme Court case in the area of securities fraud damages is Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,' in which the Court
favored use of the rescission measure. Finding that in some cases outof-pocket damages would be appropriate, the Court nevertheless held
that when the defendant subsequently resold the fraudulently acquired securities at a profit greater than the defrauded seller's actual
loss, the measure of the plaintiff's damages should be the defendant's
profit on resale.' Thus, the Court apparently indorsed the rescission
theory allowing recovery of value accretions occurring after the fraudulent transaction.
Affiliated Ute Citizens did not establish a definitive measure of
damages, however. The transaction in that case involved face-to-face
contact between a small number of purchasers and sellers rather than
the large-scale fraud which may be perpetrated through the national
securities exchanges. 8 The potential damage recovery in a successful
Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The fair value of the
security is usually computed on the date of the transaction. However, when the security is infrequently traded, as may be the case with a close corporation, subsequent
sales which more nearly reflect the true value will be used to measure the plaintiff's
loss. Id.
See cases cited in note 2 supra. See also Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 575 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
5 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D. Md. 1968), modified, 412 F.2d 571 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970). The Second Circuit has also suggested
that accretions in value may inure to defrauded purchasers, although measuring the
increase in value may be difficult. See note 18 infra.
There are other problems inherent in both measures which could affect the
amount of the damage award. For example, the date of valuation for subsequent
increases in value can greatly affect the damage award. See Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d
571, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1969), modifying 283 F. Supp. 128, 147 (D. Md. 1968). The
valuation of securities which are not readily marketable is also a problem for the
courts. See, e.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 724-26 (D.N.J. 1974); Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
£ 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1972).
7 Id., citing Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
879 (1965). See also text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
9 While privity is not required in private damage actions under Rule 10b-5, see,
e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
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private action lodged by numerous plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 for
open-market fraud would raise the spectre of corporate bankruptcy
to pay the award, and has thus been a concern of both courts and
commentators.9 The remedial measure ultimately used in open market fraud suits must turn on grounds of policy rather than restitution
or out-of-pocket measures.'"
However, since no open market suits involving a large potential
damage award have come to final judgment, courts have been able
to develop sophisticated Rule 10b-5 damage theories largely free from
these considerations. Hence, courts have prohibited recovery of punitive damages," required disgorgement of fraudulently gained prof404 U.S. 1004 (1971), no large class actions involving potentially extensive damages
have reached final judgment. The absence of a privity requirement allows persons
purchasing or selling in the open market to sue a corporation, for example, when its
officers or agents violate Rule 10b-5 through insider trading. See Texas Gulf Sulphur,
supra. Thus damages paid by the corporation may far exceed the unlawful gains of its
agents. The Second Circuit recently refused to limit the Affiliated Ute Citizens case
to privity transactions, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974), which indicates a willingness to impose liability without
regard for damage limitations.
One response to the issue of damages involving fraud in a stock traded on national
securities exchanges has been the "cover" award. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
supra at 104-06. In Mitchell, damages were awarded based on the amount it would cost
a defrauded seller to reinvest in the same security within a reasonable time after
discovery of the fraud. Damages were computed by using the highest value of the stock
within nine days following disclosure of the fraudulent conduct which had misled the
investing public. Accord, Fridrich v. Bradford, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,723 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974).
1 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 n.13 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 86667 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Cobine,
Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972 U. OF ILL. L.F.
651, 669 (1972); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of
Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchaseand Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 423, 428-29 (1968)
(suggesting that restitution damages in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation could vary
between $84 million and $390 million depending on the period selected in which recovery would be allowed). Cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Civ. No.
74-2542, 75-7003 (2d Cir. Apr. 11, 1975) (awarding $25.8 million damages for violations
of Securities Exchange Act, § 14e). See also note 37 infra.
11Suggestions for measurement of damages in open market fraud cases have been
made by several commentators. See, e.g., Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STANFORD L. REv. 371, 385 (1974);
Comment, Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for Negligently Misleading CorporateReleases:
A Proposal for the Apportionment of Losses, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 162 (1973).
"1 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 1970); Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). Punitive
damages arguably are disallowed by statute. See Securities Exchange Act § 28(a), 15
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its,'" and denied indemnity among securities fraud defendants.' 3 Each
of these damage rules was amplified by courts during the past year, 4
but two innovations were particularly significant. One such development involved the fashioning of an exception to the policy prohibiting
indemnification. The other judicial innovation revived a previously
dormant restitution-based theory which had suggested that consequential damages would be recoverable under Rule 10b-5.
The first of the two remedial developments, in the area of consequential damages, was based upon the 1965 decision of Janigan v.
Taylor.'5 In Janigan, the First Circuit stated that increases in the
value of securities subsequent to a fraudulently induced sale would
accrue to the plaintiff-seller.'" The First Circuit considered the differU.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). The explicit recovery provisions of the Securities Act also
limit recovery to the consideration paid by the the claimant. Securities Act § 11(e),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (registration statement liability); Securities Act § 12(2), 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970) (prospectus liability). Nor is there any evidence that Congress
intended to impose punitive damages by the securities acts. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., supra at 1230; Green v. Wolf Corp., supra at 303; cf. Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940).
While courts frequently deny punitive damages under federal laws, such damages are permissible under state laws. When state law will allow exemplary damages
for fraud, such damages are recoverable in federal courts on state law claims present
under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974);
Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920
(1973); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 1972).
'z SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); accord, SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). The measure of profit in such cases has been based on the difference between
the purchase price and the price at the time when the defendant could legally purchase
on the open market. This disgorgement theory was recently applied to an inside trader,
yielding an unexpected result. In SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974), the
defendant was required to disgorge paper profits in excess of acutal profits made when
the shares were finally sold. The defendant had illegally purchased shares of a corporation on undisclosed information concerning a merger possibility. The stock price rose
when the plans were announced and subsequently declined when the merger was
abandoned. The court required that paper profits as of the date of public disclosure
be disgorged to insure the deterrent effect of the securities laws. The measure was not
a penalty, the court reasoned, since the later losses merely resulted from the defendant's unwise decision to keep the stock after public disclosure. Id. at 1309. The court
cited no authority for its disgorgement of paper profits theory, but the decision is
supported by earlier case law. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra. The court
stated that restitution of paper profits was necessary to avoid a "heads-I-win-tails-youlose" opportunity for the violator who could otherwise keep subsequent profits but
would not suffer losses. 494 F.2d at 1309.
"s See text accompanying notes 27-28 infra.
1 See notes 8, 11 and 12 supra.
"s 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
" Id. at 786. The Janigan court noted that there were some limitations on this
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ence between the value of the securities at the date of sale and the
price paid, with interest from that date, and "such outlays as were
legitimately attributable to the defendant's conduct" as the proper
measure of damages.17 This measure was recently applied by two
courts to permit an action for consequential damages under the securities laws.
The Second Circuit first suggested that a plaintiff-purchaser
might recover consequential damages upon establishing a causal
nexus with the underlying fraud. 8 The Second Circuit's decision in
Zeller v. Bogue Electric Manufacturing Corp.," subsequently was
cited by the Seventh Circuit in Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman" as authority for the award of consequential damages. Madigan is the more
enlightening of the two cases; the court explained in detail both the
nature of allowable consequential damages and the requisite burden
of proof necessary to recover the claimed damages.
The corporate plaintiff in Madigan sought consequential damages
resulting from its purchase of an insolvent insurance company. The
defendant had allegedly withheld information concerning the comprinciple, such as situations in which extraordinary increases in value were effected
by subsequent special efforts of the defendant unrelated to the fraud. Increased value
attributable to such efforts could not be recovered by the plaintiffs. Id.
The Third Circuit recently adopted this limiting rule, but failed to suggest what
efforts would qualify. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974). The circuit
court overruled a district court finding that aggressive management of a corporate
officer-defendant and control of the corporation were responsible for increases in value
subsequent to the fraudulent conduct. Noting that aggressive management was within
the corporate officer's duties and that control was obtained directly by fraud, the
appellate court found that Janiganwas inapplicable to insulate the defendant from
liability for increased value. Id. at 412.
11344 F.2d at 786, quoting Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 125 (1900). The statement constitutes dicta since Janigan involved a suit by a defrauded seller.
Is Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 908 (1973). The court further suggested that there would be nothing wrong with
varying the degree of the certainty of proof necessary to show the causal nexus "somewhat inversely with the depth of the fraud." Id. at 803 n.11.
The Zeller court also indicated that it would apply the damages rule of Affiliated
Ute Citizens, see text accompanying note 7 supra, to purchasers as well as sellers. The
Affiliated Ute Citizens case involved only sellers of securities, but the Zeller decision
would apply the same rule to purchasers, granting them profits from their purchase
proceeds if such proceeds could be traced with any certainty. Id. at 802 n.10. The
difficulty in applying an increased-value recovery to purchasers is that money used to
purchase the security may be commingled with other funds or reinvested, making
calculation of the increased value complex, if not impossible. In the case of defrauded
sellers, however, the measure is based on the subsequent value of the shares sold.
19476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974).
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pany's insolvency in violation of Rule 10b-5. Although the plaintiff
later sold its stock at the original acquisition price, it claimed that
losses had been incurred in maintaining the insurance company's
solvency, paying for litigation expenses arising from the transaction,
and paying policy claims. The district court ruled that the corporate
plaintiff had suffered no damages because it had sold the shares at
the same price it had paid.2 ' On appeal, the dircuit court ruled that
recovery of consequential damages should be allowed for expenses
reasonably incurred to minimize losses, to fulfill fiduciary obligations
to insurance policy holders, and to comply with state regulations.
Thus, upon proper proof, the plaintiff could recover capital contributions to maintain the solvency of the insurance company, brokerage
commissions paid to acquire the company, and damages for lost alter22
native investments.
The results in both Madigan and Zeller have expanded the measure of recovery beyond the mere fraud and non-fraud value differential present at the time of the purchase or sale.? Such recovery will
probably be limited to those instances which involve corporate acquisitions, as in Madigan, or corporate derivative suits, as in Zeller.
The effect on ordinary investors will thus be minimal, as they will
rarely incur any expenditures beyond the purchase price of the securities.1
The second recently modified damage principle, the no-indemnity
rule, while even less significant to the interests of ordinary investors,
21 357 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
2 The court required the plaintiff to show that the danger of insolvency, which
the expenditures where made to avoid, existed prior to the sale and was fraudulently
concealed by the defendant. 498 F.2d at 239. Not all alleged damages were recoverable,
however. Losses on the purchase price, expense of other related litigation, lost profits,
and other expected benefits from the purchase were not allowed.
In Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973), the plaintiff claimed consequential damages in the form of the difference
in interest rates between what the parent corporation would have normally paid and
the lower rate it fraudulently obtained from the subsidiary. The court did not view the
plaintiff's prospects for recovery as bright, but concluded that he should have been
allowed to present his claim. Id. at 803.
" The Madigancourt stated that there was "no reason in the policy of the securities laws why [the] right to recovery should depend on exactly when the loss was
realized or on whether the loss was fully reflected in a change in the securities' price."
498 F.2d at 238-39.
21 Courts might possibly apply the lost alternative investment theory of Madigan
to ordinary investors. The Madigancourt noted that should the plaintiff seek to recover
more than the market rate of interest, he must prove with a "good deal of certainty"
that he would have made a particular alternative investment at a higher rate of return.
498 F.2d at 240.
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may become an important deterrent of fraudulent conduct by corporate officers. Generally, indemnity between joint wrongdoers has
been denied in securities fraud cases. 25 The rationale for this denial
has been that indemnity would shift the burden of damages from one
wrongdoer to another, allowing a guilty party to escape liability, and
thus would discourage compliance with the requirements of the securities laws.2" In Thomas v. DuraliteCo.2 the court allowed a corporation indemnification against its officers whose self-serving fraudulent acts saddled the corporation with vicarious liability.2 On first
impression the Thomas court's allowance of indemnity under these
limited conditions appears reasonable. Since the burden of damages
was shifted to the corporate officers who were primary wrongdoers,
the threat of massive damages paid to injured investors by the corporation based on the fraudulent misdeeds of its officers was seemingly
obviated." Such a rule may have limited application, however. In
open-market transactions which may culminate in extensive liability, 3 the damages may exceed the defendant-officers' ability to pay,
thereby imposing practical limits on the corporation's right to indemnity. Further, the shifting of liability to such defendants may
result in a financial burden far in excess of actual culpability, wrongSee, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-88 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,773 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
26 On the other hand, the same policy reasons also support enforcing contribution
among joint defendants, so that no one is free from liability. Globus v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). The no-idemnity rule has, however, been criticized
for failing to allow indemnity of less culpable defendants by more culpable ones.
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification,and Contribution,120 U. PA. L. REv. 597,
658 (1972).
386 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.J. 1974).
2 386 F. Supp. at 728, citing deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809,
816 (D. Colo. 1968), rev'd on othergrounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). The limited
provision for indemnity suggested by the district court in deHaas was not appealed to
the circuit court and had been ignored by subsequent courts. See also Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,919 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 1974). The
Gould court relied upon Thomas, among other cases, to reach the same conclusion
concerning indemnity under Rule 10b-5. However, the Gould court concluded that
such indemnity would not be allowed in an action under § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), which was the issue before the court.
2 See text accompanying note 9 supra. Obviously indemnity would not be available to the corporation when fraud could be imputed to the corporate entity.
3 E.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
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ful conduct, or ill-gotten gain. Such grossly disporportionate recovery
has been rejected as punitive in nature and not allowable under the
federal securities laws."
The limited allowance of indemnity illustrated by the Thomas
decision will serve to deter fraudulent conduct, since officers will be
unable to limit their damages to the extent of their wrongful profits.
But the indemnity principle should not be extended to allow indemnification of less culpable defendants by others more seriously implicated in the fraudulent scheme. The policy of the securities laws
imposes high standards upon officers who are associated with the
preparation of registration statements32 and stock prospectuses.3 Allowance of indemnity between these parties would only permit some
to escape liability for their failure to comply with statutory or publicly imposed duties. Disallowance of indemnity serves to insure that
all parties will adequately perform their own duties to avoid possible
liability and will work to keep other participants equally as diligent.3
The results of these recent decisions disclose neither a willingness
nor a reluctance to impose sweeping liability upon defendants in
securities fraud cases. Courts are closely examining the factual situations presented to them and are then amplifying earlier precedents.
In the context of consequential damages and indemnity, the courts
are relying upon prior decisions heretofore overlooked or ignored by
other courts in assessing damages.3 1 Consequently, a gradual broadening of potential liability without immediate or dramatic impact
upon the professional securities or financial communities is taking
place.3 6 Rule 10b-5 damage theories do not point decisively toward
3' See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969). See also note 11 supra.
32 See Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
See Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
See note 26 supra. While this development may have beneficial effects in dis-

couraging wrongdoing, there are also some disturbing implications for non-direct participants in the fraud, or aider-abettors, and in particular, accountants, attorneys and
directors. Recent developments in private actions against aider-abettors have indicated that liability will result from negligent violations of Rule 10b-5. See text accompanying notes 22-63 at 757-63. The net result of such liability, coupled with an indemnity right against pdripheral or secondary wrongdoers, will be to discourage membership
on corporate boards of directors, as well as to significantly reshape the roles of attorneys and accountants who advise or audit corporate clients.
31 See text accompanying notes 15-20, 27-28 supra.
36 Compare Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (liability of
corporate director); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (liability of corporate officers and employees for inside
trading). Broader damage recovery may, however, be offset by stricter standards of

